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COMMENT

International Adoption:
Improving on the 1993 Hague Convention
JENNIFER A. RATCLIFF†
_______________________

I. INTRODUCTION
The 1993 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and CoOperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (Hague Convention or
Convention) addresses the need to protect internationally adopted
children and promote global recognition of international adoptions.1
The Convention acts as a guide to states for building a legal structure
to govern such adoptions2 with the ultimate goal of promoting the
creation of legal systems that end practices such as child selling and
child sex trafficking.3 While emphasizing the importance of safety in
This comment was originally published in volume 23, number 1 of the
International Law Practicum (Spring 2010), a publication of the International Law
and Practice Section of the New York State Bar Association.
† Managing Editor, Maryland Journal of International Law 2009–10; J.D.,
University of Maryland School of Law, May 2010. The author wishes to thank
Professors Peter Danchin and Michael Van Alstine for their guidance and direction;
Peter Heinlein for his hard work and helpful input during the revision process of
this Comment; and, most especially, her parents and sister.
1. Hague Conference on Private International Law: Final Act of the 17th
Session, Including the Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in
Respect of Intercountry Adoption, May 29 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1134–46 (1993)
[hereinafter Hague Adoption Convention].
2. Id.
3. Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 1, at 1139 (―The States signatory to
the present Convention [are] . . . convinced of the necessity to take measures to
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international adoption, the Convention also makes clear that states’
first priority should be keeping children within their own families or
at least placing them with families in their country of origin;
international adoption should be used only as a last resort.4 These
goals are a step toward protecting the rights of internationally
adopted children, but the Convention itself does little to ensure that
they can be successfully implemented in the real world. 5 Since the
drafting of the Convention, serious problems have become apparent.
Many individual countries lack the resources and strong
governmental support needed to create and maintain a Central
Authority on adoption.6 Also, the language of the Convention is
vague, subject to broad interpretation,7 and devoid of sanctions for
countries that violate its mandates.8 These problems leave room for
individual states to enact policies that do not support an adoption
program that prioritizes the Convention’s main goal: placing children
with families within their own countries before looking to
international adoption.9 Nowhere is this clearer than in China, where
parents are restricted to one child and often have no choice but to
give up any additional children.10 The only chance these abandoned
babies have to grow up outside an orphanage is to be adopted by a
foreign family,11 an endeavor made more difficult with the passage of
a new law severely restricting who is allowed to adopt Chinese
children.12 By examining these Chinese policies in further detail, one
can see more plainly that governments can, and do, pass laws in
direct opposition to the Convention’s goal of minimizing the
institutionalization of children.13
ensure that intercountry adoptions are made in the best interests of the child and
with respect for his or her fundamental rights, and to prevent the abduction, the sale
of, or traffic in children.‖).
4. Id. (―The States signatory to the present Convention . . . [recall] that each
State should take, as a matter of priority, appropriate measures to enable the child
to remain in the care of his or her family of origin . . . [and recognize] that
intercountry adoption may offer the advantage of a permanent family to a child for
whom a suitable family cannot be found in his or her State of origin.‖)
5. See infra Part IV.
6. See infra Part IV.A.
7. See infra Part IV.B.
8. See infra Part IV.C.
9. See infra Part V.
10. See infra Part V.A.
11. See infra Part V.A.
12. See infra Part V.B.
13. See infra Part V.
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II. OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION
International adoption began in the middle of the twentieth
century, following the end of World War II, when American soldiers
arrived back home and shed light on the problem of children
displaced by the war.14 In the Declaration on Social and Legal
Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children, with
Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption,15 the United
Nations (UN) drew attention to the need that arises for adoptive
homes following calamities. The UN General Assembly expressed
concern with ―the large number of children who are abandoned or
become orphans owing to violence, internal disturbance, armed
conflicts, natural disasters, economic crises or social problems.‖16
During the 1950s, proxy adoptions, which allowed U.S. citizens to
adopt by designating a proxy agent to take their place in foreign
courts, were the most widely publicized means of international
adoption.17 Since that time, international adoptions have become
increasingly popular, particularly among Americans.18 There were
about 15,000 foreign children adopted by U.S. families between 1953
and 1962,19 compared with 17,495 in 2008 alone.20
While international adoption was once generally motivated by the
aftermath of wars, it is now much more a product of the gap between
the world’s poor and privileged populations.21 Receiving countries
14. Ellen Herman, International Adoptions, The Adoption History Project, July
11, 2007, http://www.uoregon.edu/~adoption/topics/internationaladoption.htm
[hereinafter The Adoption History Project: International Adoptions].
15. G.A. Res. 41/85, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/85 (Dec. 3, 1986).
16. Id. annex.
17. Ellen Herman, Proxy Adoptions, The Adoption History Project, July 11,
2007, http://www.uoregon.edu/~adoption/topics/proxy.htm. This practice gained
traction after 1955 when Harry and Bertha Holt, an evangelical couple from
Oregon, adopted eight Korean War orphans. Id. The Holts went on to arrange many
similar adoptions for other American families. The Adoption History Project:
International Adoptions, supra note 14.
18. Elizabeth Bartholet, Family Bonds: Adoption, Infertility, and the New
World of Child Protection 143 (Beacon Press ed., 1999) (1993).
19. The Adoption History Project: International Adoptions, supra note 14.
20. The United States Department of State, Office of Children’s Issues,
Intercountry Adoption: Total Adoptions to the United States, http://adoption.state.
gov/news/total_chart.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2010) [hereinafter Chart: Total
Adoptions to the United States (by country)]. This number includes 4,123 children
from Guatemala, 3,909 from mainland China, 1,861 from Russia, 1,725 from
Ethiopia and 1,065 from South Korea. Id.
21. BARTHOLET, supra note 18, at 141–43.
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have low birthrates and few children in need of homes; conversely,
sending countries have high birthrates and many homeless children.22
In industrialized receiving countries the demand for foreign children
has risen as the availability of children to adopt domestically has
dropped.23 This decrease is due to various factors that have emerged
in recent decades, such as the use of contraception, the legalization of
abortion, and the increased acceptance of single parents.24 On the
other hand, the practice of giving up children to international parents
is common in countries where both families and government itself
cannot care for the abandoned or orphaned children.25 For families,
the reasons could be as basic as the economic inability to afford a
child; however, there may be more complex social and political
factors at play. Poignant examples include Confucian beliefs in Korea
that promote continuing the family through an unbroken bloodline
(this stopped many Koreans from adopting displaced children
following the Korean War);26 the Ceausescu regime in Romania,
which forced women to have at least four children for the state;27 and
the one-child policy in China, which leads many families to give up
or even abort ―extra‖ children.28 For some governments, the
incapacity to care for their children could be the temporary result of a
war or an economic downturn.29 For others, the problem might be
more permanent,30 as is the case in economically underdeveloped
countries that experience a combination of population explosion and

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 141.
Id.
Id.
MARY KATHLEEN BENET, THE POLITICS OF ADOPTION 121 (1976).
Sam Jameson, Keeping Them Home, Orphan–A Shame Fades in South
Korea, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1989, at A1.
27. Jini L. Roby, Understanding Sending Country’s Traditions and Policies in
International Adoptions: Avoiding Legal and Cultural Pitfalls, 6 J.L. & FAM. STUD.
303, 314 (2004). As many as 140,000 children were institutionalized as a result of
this policy; all because Ceausescu saw children as a symbol of national pride and
power. Id. In furtherance of this policy Ceausescu outlawed birth control and
abortion. Catharine Dunphy, The Romania Adoptions: New Lives for the Children
of Turmoil, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 22, 1993, at B1. Impoverished Romanian
families often could not support so many children and had no choice but to give
them up. Id.
28. Alexa Olesen, China Sticking to One-Child Policy, WASH. POST, Jan. 23,
2007 (noting that many couples give up or abort female babies so they can have the
opportunity to try for a son).
29. BENET, supra note 25, at 121–22.
30. Id. at 121.
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depression.31 For the families and countries faced with these harsh
realities, international adoption might be the only solution.32
III. THE 1993 HAGUE CONVENTION
The Hague Convention on Protection of Children and CoOperation of Respect of Intercountry Adoption was adopted on May
29, 199333 and applies to all international adoptions between member
states.34 As of February 2010, eighty-one countries have ratified the
Convention and an additional three, Ireland, Nepal, and the Russian
Federation, are signatories but are not party to the treaty.35
The Convention’s main success was its ability to bring together
such a large number of interested parties, both to acknowledge the
need for, and to commit to working towards, international adoption
regulations.36 Previous UN declarations and conventions have
touched on international adoption, such as the Declaration of the
Rights of the Child;37 the Declaration on Social and Legal Principles
Relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children, with Special
Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption;38 and the Convention
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 122.
Id. at 121–22.
Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 1, at 1134.
Id.
Hague Conference on Private International Law, Status Table, 33:
Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect
of Intercountry Adoption, http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index_en.php?act=conventions.
status&cid=69 (last visited Apr. 18, 2010). See generally United Nations Treaty
Collection, Treaty Reference Guide: Definitions, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Over
view.aspx?path=overview/definition/page1_en.xml (last visited Apr. 18, 2010)
[hereinafter Treaty Reference Guide] (describing the difference between
―signatories‖ to a treaty and ―parties‖ to a treaty which are ―[s]tates and other
entities with treaty-making capacity which have expressed their consent to be
bound by a treaty and where the treaty is in force for such States and entities‖).
36. See BARTHOLET, supra note 18, at 150.
37. Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), princ. 6, U.N.
Doc. A/4354 (Nov. 20, 1959) (―The child, for the full and harmonious development
of his personality, needs love and understanding. He shall, wherever possible, grow
up in the care and under the responsibility of his parents, and, in any case, in an
atmosphere of affection and of moral and material security; a child of tender years
shall not, save in exceptional circumstances, be separated from his mother. Society
and the public authorities shall have the duty to extend particular care to children
without a family and to those without adequate means of support. Payment of State
and other assistance towards the maintenance of children of large families is
desirable.‖).
38. Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to Adoption and Foster
Placement of Children Nationally and Internationally, G.A. Res. 41/85, art. 17,
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on the Rights of the Child;39 but the 1993 Convention is noticeably
different.40 First, it focuses solely on international adoption.41 Second,
nearly all countries that engage in international adoption played a role
in drafting and approving it.42 Finally, it shows a different attitude
towards the idea of a child’s being adopted outside of his or her
native country. The Convention represents a ―far more enthusiastic
U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/85 (Dec. 3, 1986) (acknowledging international adoption as
an option for abandoned children, but only as a last resort: ―If a child cannot be
placed in a foster or an adoptive family or cannot in any suitable manner be cared
for in the country of origin, intercountry adoption may be considered as an
alternative means of providing the child with a family.‖).
39. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, art. 20, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989):
1. A child temporarily or permanently deprived of his or her family
environment, or in whose own best interests cannot be allowed to remain in
that environment, shall be entitled to special protection and assistance
provided by the State. 2. States Parties shall in accordance with their
national laws ensure alternative care for such a child. 3. Such care could
include, inter alia, foster placement, kafalah of Islamic law, adoption or if
necessary placement in suitable institutions for the care of children. When
considering solutions, due regard shall be paid to the desirability of
continuity in a child’s upbringing and to the child’s ethnic, religious,
cultural and linguistic background.
See also id. art. 21:
States Parties that recognize and/or permit the system of adoption shall
ensure that the best interests of the child shall be the paramount
consideration and they shall: (a) Ensure that the adoption of a child is
authorized only by competent authorities who determine, in accordance
with applicable law and procedures and on the basis of all pertinent and
reliable information, that the adoption is permissible in view of the child’s
status concerning parents, relatives and legal guardians and that, if
required, the persons concerned have given their informed consent to the
adoption on the basis of such counselling as may be necessary; (b)
Recognize that inter-country adoption may be considered as an alternative
means of child’s care, if the child cannot be placed in a foster or an
adoptive family or cannot in any suitable manner be cared for in the child’s
country of origin; (c) Ensure that the child concerned by inter-country
adoption enjoys safeguards and standards equivalent to those existing in the
case of national adoption; (d) Take all appropriate measures to ensure that,
in inter-country adoption, the placement does not result in improper
financial gain for those involved in it; (e) Promote, where appropriate, the
objectives of the present article by concluding bilateral or multilateral
arrangements or agreements, and endeavour, within this framework, to
ensure that the placement of the child in another country is carried out by
competent authorities or organs.
40. Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: Propriety, Prospects and
Pragmatics, 13 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 181, 192 (1996).
41. See generally Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 1.
42. Bartholet, supra note 40, at 192.
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endorsement of international adoption as a good solution for children
without parents than any previous international agreement.‖43 It shifts
the focus from keeping children within their country of origin at all
cost, to finding abandoned or orphaned children a permanent family,
wherever that family may reside.44 The Preamble states that
international adoption may be the best option for a child ―for whom a
suitable family cannot be found in his or her [s]tate of origin.‖45 This
change in tone establishes international adoption as a preferable
alternative to several worst case scenarios, such as institutionalization
and homelessness, while still urging countries to take ―appropriate
measures to enable the child to remain in the care of his or her
family‖46 or, if this is not possible, to make efforts to find the child a
family within his or her own country of origin.47 Despite a hierarchy
that placed international adoption near the bottom, the Convention
sought to create, at a minimum, a foundation for cooperative
international adoption law.48
The Convention has three main objectives: to ensure international
adoptions take place in the best interests of the child, to establish
cooperation among countries so as to ensure safeguards are put in
place to prevent the exploitation of children, and to promote
recognition of adoptions that conform to the Convention’s
standards.49 The Convention first sets out the requirements for
international adoptions.50 The state of origin must establish that: the
child is adoptable, international adoption is in the child’s best
interest, and the child’s parents (or the institution where the child
resides) have consented to the adoption.51 Additionally, the
Convention places a duty on the receiving state to determine that: the
prospective parents are eligible and suitable, they be counseled if
necessary, and the child is, or will be, allowed to enter the country
and permanently reside there.52

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id.
Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 1, at 1134–35.
Id. at 1139.
Id.
BARTHOLET, supra note 18, at 150.
Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 1, at 1139.
Id.
Id. at 1139–40.
Id. at 1140.

RATCLIFF MACRO - 5-14-10 (DO NOT DELETE)

2010]

IMPROVING ON THE 1993 HAGUE CONVENTION

5/27/2010 2:54 PM

343

Chapter III of the Convention requires contracting states53 to
―designate a Central Authority54 to discharge the duties which are
imposed by the Convention upon such authorities.‖55 Among other
things, Central Authorities are required to work cooperatively with
one another, to prevent any gain, financial or otherwise, in
connection with adoption and to fulfill the requirements listed above
as either a state of origin or a receiving state.56 Chapter IV lists more
specific procedures that the Central Authority must follow with
respect to individual adoptions.57 The Central Authority of the
receiving state must conduct an investigation and compile a report on
the potential adoptive parent or parents.58 If it concludes that this
person or couple is suitable, it will transmit the report to the Central
Authority of the desired country of origin, which then evaluates the
report and makes a determination on the prospective parent or
parents.59 If the country of origin’s Central Authority is satisfied, it
will transmit information about the prospective adopted child to the
new family.60 Finally, both Authorities must ensure that the child will
be able to leave his or her country of origin and enter the receiving
country.61 Thus, the Convention not only consolidates authority and
streamlines adoption practices in member states, but also creates a

53. The UN defines contracting states as ―States and other entities with treatymaking capacity which have expressed their consent to be bound by a treaty where
the treaty has not yet entered into force or where it has not entered into force for
such States and entities.‖ Treaty Reference Guide, supra note 35. Once the treaty
has entered into force for the state or entity it becomes a ―party‖ to the treaty. Id.
54. The Central Authority is described as follows:
The Central Authority is the governmental body that is responsible for
implementing the Convention. It may delegate many of its duties to other
authorities, as provided for by the convention. For the U.S., the Department
of State will provide the Central Authority, to be located in the Office of
Children’s Issues. The U.S. Central Authority is expected to delegate many
of its responsibilities concerning specific adoption cases to accredited
bodies or approved persons (for example, preparing home studies,
educating parents, and referring specific children for adoption).
Holt International, Hague Convention Definitions, http://www.holtintl.org/hague/
HagueConvDef.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2010).
55. Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 1, at 1140.
56. Id. at 1140–41.
57. Id. at 1141–42.
58. Id. at 1141.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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process of cooperation between the two concerned countries.62
Chapter V of the Convention concerns the recognition and effects
of the adoption.63 Among other things, it mandates that an adoption
may only be refused if it ―is manifestly contrary to [the state’s] public
policy.‖64 Chapter V also asserts the Convention’s recognition of the
legal relationship between a child and his or her adoptive parents and
the termination of this relationship, upon the finalization of the
adoption, between the child and his or her birth parents.65 Chapter VI
lists general provisions.66 Perhaps most notably, it states that ―[n]o
one shall derive improper financial or other gain from an activity
related to an intercountry adoption‖ and limits any fees to ―costs and
expenses.‖67
IV. PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE HAGUE CONVENTION
The Hague Convention was the first declaration of its kind to
acknowledge the reality that international adoption is sometimes a
positive solution for abandoned and orphaned children.68 In bringing
so many nations together to address this singular issue, the
Convention also brought international attention to both the virtues of
the system and the problems it still faces. Despite these
achievements, however, the Convention is deficient in several areas,
and it has left holes in the international adoption system that have
permitted further abuses.
A. Many Countries Lack the Resources or Governmental
Support Necessary for Creating and Maintaining a Central
Authority
The Convention’s requirement for a Central Authority in each
contracting state was designed to ensure that each country that
participated in international adoption had a medium through which
the UN’s adoption standards could be promoted and enforced.69 This
idea is sound in theory, but in practice it has proven unrealistic.70
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See supra Part III.
Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 1, at 1142.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1143–44.
Id. at 1143.
See supra notes 36–40 and accompanying text.
Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 1, at 1140.
See supra Part IV.A.
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Such an endeavor requires funding and a revamping of the adoption
systems of most countries, a goal which may be impossible for
underdeveloped nations to achieve.
In Romania, one of the first countries to ratify the Convention, the
failure to fix the severely crippled adoption system has effectively led
to the end of all international adoptions of Romanian children. 71 In
1997, prospective adoptive parents began to complain that the system
had become too slow and overly bureaucratic;72 unfortunately, when
Romania attempted to simplify and improve it, the results were
disastrous. The newly implemented laws opened the door to
corruption that the government was not equipped to address.73 When
Romania applied for membership to the European Union (EU), the
EU demanded that it overhaul its entire adoption system as a
prerequisite for joining.74 In an attempt to reevaluate and reform the
system, Romania issued, in June 2001, a ―temporary‖ moratorium on
all international adoptions.75 The U.S. agreed with this decision at the
time and acknowledged that Romania’s legal framework had not
always protected the best interest of the child.76 The U.S. made
recommendations on how Romania’s adoption procedures could be
improved and reiterated that the child’s interest is paramount.77
Within a month of the moratorium, Romania passed a law that
banned international adoption of Romanian children by anyone other
than grandparents.78 Political changes, political opposition,
uncertainty regarding international adoptions, and a lack of finances
71. Maura Harty, Assistant Sec’y of State for Consular Affairs, Testimony to the
Comm’n on Sec. and Cooperation in Eur. (Sept. 14, 2005) (discussing how
Romania’s adoption laws failed to protect their children and how this led to their
moratorium on international adoption), available at http://www.passportsusa.com/
law/legal/testimony/testimony_2635.html.
72. Molly S. Marx, Whose Best Interests Does it Really Serve? A Critical
Examination of Romania’s Recent Self-Serving International Adoption Policies, 21
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 373, 383 (2007).
73. Id. at 384.
74. Id. at 386–87.
75. On the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of the Child, Law No.
272/2004, Rom. O.G. (2004). For a summary of this law in English, see The
Library of Congress Global Legal Information Network, http://content.glin.gov/su
mmary/140306 (last visited Apr. 18, 2010).
76. Harty, supra note 71.
77. Id.
78. On Legal Status of Adoption, Law No. 273/2004, Rom O.G. (2004). For a
summary of this law in English, see The Library of Congress Global Legal
Information Network, http://content.glin.gov/summary/118895 (last visited Apr.
18, 2010).
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kept Romania from reforming the system to bring it in line with the
Convention;79 and, as a result, both laws remain in force to this day.
This policy has left more than 80,000 Romanian children to live in
orphanages or foster care without a permanent family.80
The situation is perhaps even worse in Cambodia, where the
government’s inability to effectively regulate has lead to the adoption
of countless kidnapped or purchased children for profit.81 Despite
being aware of rampant fraud within the system, the Cambodian
government was not able to create a way to successfully evaluate visa
applications on behalf of orphans.82 The child trafficking problem in
Cambodia, which was most prevalent between 1997 and 2001,83 is
―the most documented instance of large-scale child laundering within
the intercountry adoption system.‖84 In fact, it is likely that most of
the 1,609 Cambodian children that were adopted in the U.S. during
that time were laundered.85 As a result, on December 21, 2001,86 the
U.S. government suspended all adoptions from Cambodia.87
The Convention’s Central Authority requirement is instrumental to
setting and maintaining standards for international adoption in each

79. H.R. Res. 578, 109th Cong. (2005).
80. UNICEF, Romania: Background, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/roma

nia_background.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2010).
81. David M. Smolin, Child Laundering: How the Intercountry Adoption System
Legitimizes and Incentivizes the Practices of Buying, Trafficking, Kidnapping and
Stealing Children, 52 WAYNE L. REV. 113, 145 (2006).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 144–45.
84. Id. at 135. See Ethica, Cambodian Adoption Investigation/Prosecution
Documents, http://www.ethicanet.org/item.php?recordid=camdocs&pagestyle=def
ault (last visited Apr. 18, 2010) (showing many of the relevant U.S. government
documents concerning criminal prosecutions in the Cambodian adoption laundering
scandal).
85. Id. at 137.
86. The U.S. government suspended all adoption of Cambodian children on
December 21, 2001. However, at that time, there were a number of adoptions
already underway and at various stages of the process. These ―pipeline‖ cases
continued to be evaluated and, if appropriate, were approved. As a result, there is
data available on Cambodian adoptions to the U.S. as late as 2003. Trish Maskew,
Child Trafficking and Intercountry Adoption: The Cambodian Experience, 35
CUMB. L. REV. 619, 621–25 (2005).
87. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Serv.,
INS Announces Suspension of Cambodian Adoptions and Offer of Parole in
Certain Pending Cases (Dec. 21, 2001), available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/pres
srelease/CambAdop_122101.pdf.
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contracting state.88 While the theory behind this mandate makes
sense, in practice it is clear that the Convention’s demand for
adoption system reform does not automatically make such reform
happen. Both the Romanian and Cambodian governments have
proven unable or unwilling to carry out reforms they agreed to when
they signed on to the treaty, leaving tens of thousands of children
institutionalized following the passage of laws that ended their
chances of adoption. These laws prove that the systems at issue are
deeply flawed, and major improvements must be made to bring them
in line with the Convention. The Convention, however, provides no
support to help these countries achieve those improvements.89
B. The Convention Is Vague and Subject to Broad Interpretation
While the Convention clearly describes the duties of the Central
Authority,90 many other aspects of the Convention are not so
straightforward. Much of the ambiguity has to do with the definition
of certain words.91 For instance, while the Convention explicitly
states that it is up to the Central Authority in the country of origin to
determine if the child in question is ―adoptable,‖92 it gives no
indication as to what that means.93 It does not even list minimum
requirements for finding a child adoptable.94 In many countries the
system is burdened by practices such as forcing a parent or guardian
to surrender his or her legal rights to the child so others can sell the
child to be adopted.95 The primary means by which launderers in
Cambodia persuaded parents to give up their children were false
statements such as: ―a rich family will raise your baby in the United
States; . . . . [w]hen your child becomes an adult, he can petition for

88. See supra Part III.
89. See Smolin, supra note 81, at 145–47 (discussing the Cambodian

government’s inability to screen out cases of purchased or stolen children). See
generally Harty, supra note 71 (discussing the problems within the Romanian
adoption system and how the government could not cope with them).
90. See supra Part III.
91. See generally Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 1.
92. Id. at 1139 (―An adoption within the scope of the Convention should take
palace only if the competent authorities of the State of origin . . . have established
that the child is adoptable . . . .‖).
93. See generally Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 1.
94. Id.
95. Smolin, supra note 81, at 115–17 (discussing the practice of launderers who
buy or steal children from their birth families; thus, blurring the line between ―true
orphans‖ and ―paper orphans‖).
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you to immigrate to the United States.‖96 Alternatively, and perhaps
more cruelly, some parents were told that their child would be given
a better life in Cambodia and that they could visit and/or take the
child back at any time.97 The Convention does not mandate that
countries look into the background of how a child came to be an
orphan and, left unchecked, many governments might find such a
laundered child to be ―adoptable‖ simply by virtue of the fact that he
or she no longer has a legal guardian. By allowing such crucial terms
to remain undefined and open to interpretation, the Convention runs
the risk that some Central Authorities might be uncertain as to which
children are appropriate candidates for adoption.
C. The Convention Is Difficult to Enforce and Does Not Impose
Sanctions
While the Convention is the international community’s first
attempt to set a standard that emphasizes the child’s interest within
the international adoption system, it does little to ensure that
contracting states adhere to that standard or other mandates.98 One
reason for this problem is the Central Authority system itself.
According to Article 6 of the Convention, the Central Authority is
responsible for enforcing the Convention in each individual country,
and the government is in charge of supervising the Central
Authority.99 This practice allows each country to police its own
international adoption system however it chooses, despite the
Convention’s intention that every government should look first to its
children’s best interests.100
Not only are Central Authorities inadequately scrutinized, but there
96. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, BACKGROUNDER:
OPERATION BROKEN HEARTS (2004).
97. Id.
98. See generally Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 1.
99. Id. at 1140. Article 6 provides:
(1) A Contracting State shall designate a Central Authority to discharge the
duties which are imposed by the Convention upon such authorities.
(2) Federal States, States with more than one system of law or States
having autonomous territorial units shall be free to appoint more than one
Central Authority and to specify the territorial or personal extent of their
functions. Where a State has appointed more than one Central Authority, it
shall designate the Central Authority to which any communication may be
addressed for transmission to the appropriate Central Authority within that
State.
Id.
100. See generally Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 1.
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are no sanctions contained in the Convention that can be used to
punish a country that violates its requirements.101 Issuing
moratoriums on adoptions from countries with systems that do not
meet the Convention’s requirements is the only recourse that has
been used.102 This ―solution‖ is ill-advised for three reasons. First,
there is no broad authority that can end all adoptions from a particular
country. Instead, either the country itself must decide that its system
is so in need of reform that it cannot continue with international
adoptions, or other individual countries must refuse to adopt from the
deficient country. Second, the decision to end all adoptions often is
not reached until the problem is out of hand, such as with the baby
laundering epidemic in Cambodia.103 This is likely a direct result of
allowing only self-regulation. Finally, ending international adoptions
is not an ideal solution; while it may temporarily stop a corrupt
system, it will lead many children to end up in institutions because
sending countries generally have more children in need than they do
domestic families willing to adopt.104 The focus must be on helping
countries to reform rather than forcing them to shut down. The
situation as it is will continue as long as there is no overarching
authority to oversee the practices and procedures of individual
Central Authorities.105
V. STATE POLICIES INCONSISTENT
ON CHINA

WITH THE

CONVENTION: FOCUS

It is clear that the Convention is far from flawless.106 While the
discussion thus far has focused on problems that arise because
countries either will not or cannot reform their adoption systems to
meet the standards of the Convention,107 there is an additional
problem. Many complex issues arise as a result of state policies that
directly contradict the Convention’s goals. Nowhere is this problem
more evident than in China where the one-child policy and new
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.A.
S. Res. 359, 109th Cong. (2006) (urging the government of Romania to
reform their adoption system and resume international adoptions to ensure all
Romanian children are raised in permanent families); Harty, supra note 71
(discussing the need to urge the government of Romania to resume intercountry
adoptions for the sake of Romanian children in need).
105. See infra Part VI.
106. See supra Part IV.
107. See supra Part IV.
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adoption requirements actually increase the number of children in
need of a home while simultaneously preventing more children from
being adopted.108 In doing so, China goes against the Convention’s
prioritizing of adoption over institutionalization.109
A. China’s One-Child Policy Is in Direct Tension with the
Convention
China enacted its famous one-child policy in 1980 to address the
problem of overpopulation.110 The policy restricts families to having
only one child unless their regional government permits them to have
more.111 Even if such permission is granted, the couple will still be
penalized.112 Penalties include the ―loss of state benefits, housing or
employment,‖ which most poor families cannot afford.113 As a result,
China has a notorious problem with abandoned and orphaned
children. As of 2008, there were at least twenty million orphaned
children living there.114 Since 1992, when China first began to allow

108. See infra Part V.A–B.
109. See infra Part V.A–B.
110. The Marriage Law of the People’s Republic of China was adopted by the

Third Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress on April 10, 1980 and
became effective on January 1, 1981. For the English text of the law, see
LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS COMMISSION OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE
NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS OF THE P.R.C., THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 184–86 (1987). Article 2 of the Marriage Law states in part:
―Family planning shall be practised.‖ Id. Article 12 of the Marriage Law states:
―Both husband and wife shall have the duty to practise family planning.‖ Id.
111. CHRISTOPHER BAGLEY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSRACIAL
ADOPTIONS: A MENTAL HEALTH PROSPECTIVE 188–89 (1993).
112. Id.
113. Id. Aside from the problems the one-child policy causes the international
adoption system, it has serious human rights implications as well. See Forced
Abortion and Sterilization in China: The View From the Inside: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. On Int’l Operations and Human Rights of the H. Comm. On Int’l Rel.,
105th Cong. (1998) (discussing the Chinese government’s use of forced abortions
and sterilizations to enforce their one-child policy); Olesen, supra note 28 (pointing
out the huge disparity between boys and girls in China as a result of couples
aborting or giving up female babies); see The Earthquake, N.Y. TIMES, May 18,
2008 (reporting that most parents who lost children in the devastating earthquake in
May 2008 lost their only child because of the one-child policy). See generally Jim
Yardley, China to Reconsider One-Child Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2008
(reporting that China is considering alternative ways to control their population in
an attempt to soften their human rights image).
114. NPR Weekend Edition Saturday: Considering China’s One-Child Policy
(National Public Radio May 24, 2008), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/
story/story.php?storyId=90801479.
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international adoption,115 it has become one of the world’s leading
sources for internationally adopted children.116
The one-child policy puts a strain on China’s adoption system by
increasing the number of institutionalized children in three ways. The
first is the most obvious: families are allowed only one child so that,
unless they are among the few that can afford to pay for more, they
are forced to give up any subsequent children.117 Second, the policy
makes any domestic adoption system effectively impossible. Because
all Chinese couples are limited to one child, the overwhelming
majority of couples, aside from those who are unable to have
children, will choose to have their own baby rather than adopt.118
Finally, cultural ideas about gender have led to a surplus of
abandoned baby girls.119 A higher value has traditionally been placed
on sons than on daughters.120 While this archaic belief has begun to
change, it still prevails, particularly in rural China where the majority
of the population lives.121 As a result, many families give up
daughters (even firstborns) so that they can try for a son.122 This leads
to a disproportionate number of girls in orphanages and to a general
115. Although China began to formally allow international adoptions in 1992,
the practice was suspended later that year for 10 months as a result of corruption
within the system. Chris Yeung, New Agency to Monitor Child Adoption, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Feb. 14, 1994, at 7. International adoption in China has continued
uninterrupted since this ban was lifted. Id.
116. United States Department of State, Office of Children’s Issues,
Intercountry
Adoption:
China—Country
Information,
http://adoption.state.gov/country/china.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2010) [hereinafter
Adoptions from China to the United States] (indicating that over 54,000 children
have been adopted from China by U.S. families in the last ten years); Chart: Total
Adoptions to the United States (by country), supra note 20 (showing that China has
been the nation with the most adoptions to the U.S. for four out of the last five
years).
117. Olesen, supra note 28.
118. Nili Luo, Intercountry Adoption and China: Emerging Questions and
Developing Chinese Perspectives, 35 CUMB. L. REV. 597, 610–11 (2004). In 1999,
China revised its adoption law to say that a family’s one child quota would not be
effected by any children they might adopt; only their biological child. Id. at 610–
13. While this is a step in the right direction, the law has a gaping loophole: it
applies only to children who passed through the social welfare system. Id. Any
other children adopted by a Chinese couple counts as that couple’s ―one-child.‖ Id.
119. Olesen, supra note 28.
120. Bagley, supra note 111, at 188–89 (explaining that many people still
subscribe to old beliefs that favor male children in order to ensure that parents
receive better support in their old-age and the carrying on of the family name).
121. Id.
122. Id.
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increase in the number of children in need of adoption. It is bad
enough that families are forced to give up any children following
their first, but the problem severely worsens if couples keep
abandoning their babies in order to get the one that they want. What
if a couple has two, three, five, or more girls before they have a boy?
They will ultimately relinquish many more children in this pursuit
than if they had kept their first child and had to give up more only in
the event of a subsequent unplanned pregnancy.
This policy and its effects directly conflict with the principles of
the Convention. While the strong cultural attachment of the Chinese
to bloodlines falls within the Convention’s first choice scenario—that
is, that a child be raised within his or her birth family—the laws
enacted by the government that place a limit on children make this
goal next to impossible to achieve. The Convention’s second-best
option, domestic adoption, is difficult for the reasons already
mentioned. Additionally, it may be unacceptable to some as a result
of their affinity for blood relations in families.123 Short of
institutionalization, international adoption becomes the only choice.
The Convention obviously recognizes such adoption as a viable
option,124 but reliance on it to such an extent is contrary to the
Convention’s goal of keeping children at least within their country of
origin.
B. China’s New, More Restrictive Adoption Laws May Reduce
Foreign Adoptions Without Encouraging Domestic Adoptions
On May 1, 2007, the China Center for Adoption Affairs enacted a
law that set strict guidelines for perspective adoptive parents. 125 The
law includes age and income restrictions as well as a requirement that
each child be adopted by a heterosexual married couple.126 It also
restricts people with certain ―health‖ conditions including AIDS,
mental disability, blindness in either eye, severe facial deformation or
a body mass index of forty or more.127 As a result, the number of
123.
124.
125.
126.

Luo, supra note 118 at 613–14.
See generally Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 1.
Adoptions from China to the United States, supra note 116.
Id. The law requires that both parents be thirty to fifty years old (thirty to
fifty-five if they are adopting a disabled child) and that they have a collective
annual income of at least $80,000. Id. In addition, it requires couples to be married
for two years (five years if either has been previously divorced) and does not allow
more than two divorces in the couple’s past. Id.
127. Id.
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Chinese adoptions in the U.S. has dropped from 6,492 in 2006 to
5,453 in 2007 to 3,911 in 2008, and finally, to 3,001 in 2009.128 The
law is still very new, but it is already having an effect on Chinese
adoption. Every abandoned child that is not adopted is
institutionalized. While it is true that China has the autonomy under
the Convention to determine if particular prospective parents are
―suitable,‖129 one could make the argument that this new law restricts
many couples that would be deemed suitable under the Convention’s
interpretation of that word. By preventing these people from
adopting, the Chinese government is allowing some children to be
put in an institution rather than be placed with a family, which is
against the priorities established by the Convention.130
VI. INTERNATIONAL OVERSIGHT
THE HAGUE CONVENTION

TO

AMELIORATE DEFICIENCIES

OF

While it is impossible to address all of the problems within the
international adoption system, especially all at once, an overarching
UN international central authority to supervise each of the individual
Central Authorities could go a long way in alleviating some of these
issues. The Convention was the first of its kind and was intended to
create at least a foundation for cooperative international adoption
law.131 It is hard to imagine how any new set of laws will apply in real
world situations, but now that so many counties have implemented or
attempted to implement the Convention’s principles, the gaps and
problems within these mandates are more apparent.
Romania and Cambodia are just two examples of an unfortunate
trend: countries ending their adoption programs because they cannot
reform them to meet the Convention’s standards.132 These
moratoriums are not an acceptable solution; they hurt the children in
these countries more than anyone else,133 which is in direct opposition
to the Convention’s principle that one act ―in the best interest of the
child.‖134 If there were a UN appointed body to oversee this, it could
look at the individual problems within each of these struggling
countries and work with them to devise a plan that would be feasible
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Chart: Total Adoptions to the United States (by country), supra note 20.
Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 1, at 1141.
Id. at 1134–35.
BARTHOLET, supra note 18, at 150.
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.A.
Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 1, at 1139–40.

RATCLIFF MACRO - 5-14-10 (DO NOT DELETE)

354

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

5/27/2010 2:54 PM

[Vol. 25:336

within their individual frameworks. Similarly, this body could
address the ambiguity of the Convention.135 Rather than waiting for a
new Convention to convene on this issue, which may not happen in
the near future, the UN body would be in charge of interpreting and
construing the language of the Convention. This would provide all
countries with one clear, uniform standard on which to base the
respective systems.136 Lastly, rather than leave the enforcement of the
Convention to each individual country, this solution would allow for
a more impartial implementation of the law.137 Not only would the
UN body make sure that the Convention is being applied correctly, it
would also exact an appropriate penalty on countries whose
international adoption systems do not meet the UN’s requirements.
In attempting to put the Convention’s central principles into
practice most effectively, one must be optimistic but also realistic as
to what can be done. While a UN-appointed authoritative body would
be a step in the right direction, there is only so much it could do to
eradicate the problems in international adoption. Powerful countries
like China, whose policies create more abandoned children and fewer
adoptive parents, are extremely unlikely to reform their laws to bring
them in line with the Convention’s standards. This is especially true
of the one-child policy, which has been ingrained in the Chinese legal
system for almost thirty years.138 In countries where the government
genuinely wants to reform international adoption, however, the
addition of a new authoritative body could make a significant
difference. The same could be said for countries that did not actively
enact laws contrary to the Convention’s principles but which
nonetheless violate its mandates. An international body put in place
to oversee the individual Central Authorities would go a long way in
making the Convention’s abstract policies more of a reality.
VII. CONCLUSION
The greatest achievement of the 1993 Hague Convention is that it
indentified and brought attention to the problems within the
international adoption system. Unfortunately, it also brought along
problems of its own.139 The Convention fails to provide support for
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part IV.C.
See supra note 110.
See supra Part IV.
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countries that lack the infrastructure to reform their adoption systems
and to create a Central Authority;140 it lacks clear, specific
guidelines;141 and it contains no effective enforcement strategies or
sanctions to ensure compliance.142 Perhaps most troublesome is the
fact that certain countries, such as China, enact measures that are in
direct opposition to the Convention’s goals.143 One way to address
these issues would be to create a central authoritative body to oversee
each adoption system, help countries struggling to reform, and
penalize countries that refuse to comply with the Convention’s
standards.144 The 1993 Hague Convention is the first treaty of its kind
to both address international adoption specifically and endorse it as a
preferred alternative to institutionalization.145 The international
community must do all it can to ensure that those countries that
engage in international adoption maintain it as an institution worthy
of such an endorsement.

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part IV.C.
See supra Part V.
See supra Part VI.
Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 1, at 1134–35.

